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Behaviorally, children’s explicit theory of mind (ToM) proceeds in a progression of
mental-state understandings: developmentally, children demonstrate accurate explicit
desire-reasoning before accurate explicit belief-reasoning. Given its robust and
cross-cultural nature, we hypothesize this progression may be paced in part by
maturation/specialization of the brain. Neuroimaging research demonstrates that the
right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) becomes increasingly selective for ToM reasoning
as children age, and as their ToM improves. But this research has narrowly focused on
beliefs or on undifferentiated mental-states. A recent ERP study in children included a
critical contrast to desire-reasoning, and demonstrated that right posterior potentials
differentiated belief-reasoning from desire-reasoning. Taken together, the literature
suggests that children’s desire-belief progression may be paced by specialization of the
right TPJ for belief-reasoning specifically, beyond desire-reasoning. In the present study,
we tested this hypothesis directly by examining children’s belief- and desire-reasoning
using functional near-infrared spectroscopy in conjunction with structural magnetic
resonance imaging to pinpoint brain activation in the right TPJ. Results showed greatest
activation in the right TPJ for belief-reasoning, beyond desire-reasoning, and beyond
non-mental reasoning (control). Findings replicate and critically extend prior ERP results,
and provide clear evidence for a specific neural mechanism underlying children’s
progression from understanding desires to understanding beliefs.
Keywords: theory of mind (ToM), fNIRS, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), beliefs, desires, child development,
developmental cognitive neuroscience
Introduction
Theory of mind (ToM) is a complex, cognitive phenomenon. Though sometimes equated with
children’s achievement of understanding false beliefs, ToM is conceptually and developmentally
broader than that. Often termed a belief-desire naïve psychology, ToM involves understanding
multiple causally interconnected mental concepts, and developmentally, children proceed through
a progression of mental-state understandings.
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A crucial, well-documented progression is that children
consistently achieve an explicit understanding of desires before
demonstrating an explicit understanding of beliefs (e.g., Gopnik
and Slaughter, 1991; Bartsch and Wellman, 1995; Wellman and
Liu, 2004). This progression holds across tasks matched on
procedural methodology, as in the ‘diverse desires’ and ‘diverse
beliefs’ tasks where children predict the actions of a character
with preference or belief opposite to the child’s own (seeWellman
and Liu, 2004 for a meta-analysis). Despite the match in task
demands and format, both typically developing and socially
delayed children (i.e., children with autism and deaf children
born to non-signing families) consistently pass diverse-desires
tasks at an earlier age than diverse-beliefs tasks (Wellman and
Liu, 2004; Peterson et al., 2005), and do so across several cultures
and languages (e.g., Kristen et al., 2006; Wellman et al., 2006).
Though the use of implicit measures (i.e., eye-gaze) suggests
some forms of belief-understanding exist prior to age 2 years,
tasks requiring a deliberate verbal or pointing response strongly
support a developmental progression of explicit understanding of
desires before explicit understanding of beliefs.
What accounts for this progression? Given its robust
and cross-cultural nature, an intriguing hypothesis is that
neuromaturational factors in part underlie this development.
Thus, in the present study, we use neuroscientiﬁc methods to help
shed light on this important but as yet unanswered question.
Abundant studies have identiﬁed a network of brain regions
consistently supporting ToM in both adults and children (e.g.,
Castelli et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003; Saxe et al., 2009; Gweon et al., 2012; see also Carrington
and Bailey, 2009; Bowman and Wellman, 2014 for reviews). In
particular, neuroimaging studies demonstrate that adults exhibit
a more focused and narrowed recruitment of temporoparietal
junction (TPJ)—especially the right TPJ—for belief reasoning,
beyond recruitment for more generalized social reasoning
(Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Saxe and Powell, 2006). In children,
however, there is some evidence that TPJ is less specialized
compared to adults (Mosconi et al., 2005; Pfeifer et al., 2009;
Sabbagh et al., 2009; Saxe et al., 2009; Gweon et al., 2012).
For example, for false-belief processing (Sommer et al., 2010)
and for general mental-state processing (Gweon et al., 2012),
although both children and adults show similar recruitment in
cortical midline regions (i.e., dorsal MPFC and dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex, precuneus), additional activation occurs in
the TPJ in adults but not in children (Sommer et al., 2010).
Moreover, children’s right TPJ becomes increasingly selective for
mental-state processing, beyond more general physical and social
processing, as they age over early to middle childhood (Saxe et al.,
2009), and as behavioral ToM performance improves (Gweon
et al., 2012).
However, existing neuroscientiﬁc investigations of ToM
have narrowly focused on belief-reasoning, or on mental-state
reasoning in general, ignoring critical comparisons to desire-
reasoning which are central to uncovering neural mechanisms
underlying children’s progressive mental-state understandings as
evidenced in the behavioral data. Only one recent study has
directly examined the neural correlates of belief- and desire-
reasoning in children. Bowman et al. (2012) recorded ERPs when
7- and 8-years-old performed diverse-desires and diverse-beliefs
tasks, expanding on the work of Liu et al. (2009) who used the
same tasks and methods with adults. As a control, participants
performed parallel non-mental, diverse-physical tasks (requiring
reasoning about where diﬀerent things go). For both adults and
children, results revealed two neural systems for belief- and
desire-reasoning: one associated with mid-frontal scalp regions
in which potentials for belief- and desire-reasoning equally
diﬀerentiated from potentials for the physical control, but not
from each other, and another associated with right-posterior
scalp regions in which potentials for belief- and desire-reasoning
critically diﬀered. In children, this right posterior belief-desires
distinction emerged only when children exhibited accurate belief-
reasoning.
These ERP results, in conjunction with neuroimaging
ﬁndings demonstrating developmental specialization of the right
TPJ, suggest a straightforward but important developmental
possibility: there are developing specializations within TPJ
recruited for speciﬁcally belief-reasoning over and above
reasoning about desires, and this specialization may pace, in part,
children’s progression from explicit understanding of desires to
explicit understanding of beliefs (Wellman and Liu, 2004).
The present study tests this hypothesis directly. The low
spatial resolution of ERP methods leaves unknown whether the
“right posterior” ﬁndings from Bowman et al. (2012) actually
correspond to the right TPJ. Thus here we provide needed
validation by obtaining converging and neuroanatomically
speciﬁed measurements of children’s brain activity for the
same diverse-belief and diverse-desire tasks as used in the
Bowman et al. (2012) ERP study, adjusted for hemodynamic
data collection via functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS).
fNIRS facilitates pinpointing of brain activation in speciﬁc
cortical regions of interest (ROI), and thus via ROI analyses,
can address the central question of whether children’s right
TPJ exhibits specialization for belief-reasoning beyond desire-
reasoning.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) could also
provide the needed localized activation data, but we opted for
fNIRS because it is more child friendly. Though localization
accuracy is not as high as fMRI, fNIRS is less susceptible to
movement artifact, is quiet, and does not require conﬁnement to
a narrow tube during testing—factors helpful for collecting data
from younger children, especially when administering tasks with
large numbers of trials as in the present study (e.g., see Brink
et al., 2011 for fNIRS study examining cognitive and aﬀective
empathy in children 4- to 8-years-old). One drawback of fNIRS
is that it can record activity in only the surface layers of cortex;
it cannot penetrate to deeper, medial regions (Huppert et al.,
2009), especially medial-frontal regions (Cooper et al., 2012).
Fortunately, right TPJ lies in the surface layers of the right
posterior cortex, making fNIRS suitable for examining the focal
hypothesis for this study, which concerns early development and
specialization of speciﬁcally the right TPJ.
We conducted an ROI analysis targeting the fNIRS channels
overlaying the right TPJ. We hypothesized greater activity in
these channels during children’s belief-reasoning compared to
their desire-reasoning, and compared to non-mental reasoning
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(physical control condition), which would critically replicate and
extend ERP ﬁndings from Bowman et al. (2012), linking them
to broader neuroimaging literature, and providing clear evidence
that children’s developmental progression from desire- to belief-
understanding may be paced in part by a specialization the right
TPJ for belief-reasoning. We also targeted left TPJ given adult
and child neuroimaging studies also implicate this region in
ToM.We hypothesized left TPJ may also show greatest activation
to belief-reasoning, in line with the common pattern of more
diﬀuse/bilateral neural specialization observed in early versus
later development (Casey et al., 2000). Finally, we recorded from
the anterior frontal cortex (AFC), which is not implicated in the
ToM neural network, and therefore should not show activation
for mental-state reasoning beyond a non-mental control. Data
from this AFC ROI thus served as important contrast to our
focal TPJ ROIs, to ensure data from those focal ROIs did not
simply reﬂect changes in systemic blood ﬂow from scalp or
other tissues that lie above the cortex (Boas et al., 2004; Aslin,
2012).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-one typically developing children (13 males) ages 6-
to 10-years-old participated in the study. All recruitment and
collection procedures complied with our institution’s ethics
review board. Parents gave written informed consent and
children gave verbal informed assent prior to participation in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Data collection
stopped when the fNIRS system (on temporary loan to our
institution) was no longer available. All participants were
right handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Performance on standardized verbal and non-verbal intelligence
tests from the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test 2 (KBIT-2;
Kaufman and Kaufman, 1990) conﬁrmed this sample had
age- and grade-appropriate verbal and non-verbal IQ abilities
(verbal IQ: M = 29, SD = 7.58; non-verbal IQ: M = 28.64,
SD = 5.66). Ten children were excluded from ﬁnal data
analysis: four due to equipment malfunction; ﬁve who did
not pass the data artifact criteria (see imaging methods
below); and one due to below-chance performance across
all conditions indicating inattention to the task. The ﬁnal
sample consisted of 11 children (age range: 74–129 months;
M = 92.9, SD = 15.84; nine males). Importantly, children in
this sample were drawn from the same geographic area as that
of the Bowman et al. (2012) ERP study, and the ages of that
sample and this one did not diﬀer statistically [t(28) = −1.03,
p = 0.278].
Measures and Procedure
fNIRS Tasks
We used the same tasks as Bowman et al. (2012): multi-trial
diverse-desires, diverse-beliefs, and diverse-physical judgment
(as control). Only the duration of the trial phases and the
overall block structure were changed to optimally capture the
hemodynamic response measured by fNIRS.
In each trial, for each of the three conditions, the participant
heard a recorded female voice aurally present information about
(a) a boy and girl with diverse desires (e.g., the boy likes apples
but the girl likes grapes) for the Desires condition, (b) a boy and
girl with diverse beliefs (e.g., the boy thinks the box has apples but
the girl thinks the box has grapes) for the Beliefs condition, or (c)
two bins that each held diﬀerent things (e.g., the red bin holds
apples but the blue bin holds grapes) for the Physical condition.
At the end of the trial, participants heard a corresponding target
question: (a) For Desires: “Who says ‘I’ll have some’ when they see
this?”/“Who says ‘I won’t have any’ when they see this?” (when
the story was about food), or “Who says ‘I’ll play with it’ when
they see this?”/“Who says ‘I won’t play with it’ when they see
this?” (when the story was about toys). (b) For Beliefs: “Who says
‘I was right’ when they see this?” or “Who says ‘I was wrong’ when
they see this?” And (c) for the Physical condition: “Where do you
put this?” or “Where do you not put this?” Figure 1A provides
a schematic of task conditions (for full description, see Bowman
et al., 2012).
The trial type (food or toys) as well as the question
presented (positive or negative wording) were randomized in
each trial and balanced across conditions and runs. After
the target question, participants immediately saw a picture
of one of the two foods/toys (e.g., apples). After seeing
the revealed food/toy, the boy and girl (for Desires/Beliefs
conditions) or two bins (for Physical condition) reappeared
on screen, and participants were then allowed to answer by
choosing one of the two characters/bins via button press.
Because trials for all three conditions were constructed to have
the same perceptual and linguistic structure, any diﬀerences
between conditions point to diﬀerences in processing the
content of the questions—belief-processing, desire-processing,
or non-mental processing—beyond these perceptual and task
similarities.
The task was presented in three runs of 10 experimental blocks
(26 s per block) and nine rest blocks (15 s per block); these
durations are within the range of other block designs capturing
hemodynamic response in children with both fMRI (e.g.,
Gweon et al., 2012) and fNIRS (Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2011).
Experimental and rest blocks alternated, with the experimental
block beginning and ending each run. Each experimental block
consisted of two trials (13 s per trial; 8 s for information phase
plus 1.5 s for target image duration, plus 3.5 s allowed for the
target questions and participant response), and trials within a
block were always of the same condition (e.g., two Physical
trials or two Beliefs trials). See Figure 1B for task and block
structure.
Each condition type occurred in three blocks in two of the
runs, and four blocks in one of the runs. Order of condition
blocks was randomized except that no one condition type
repeated successively. At the end of each run (6.6 min in
duration), participants could take a small break. Total experiment
time including breaks was ∼25–30 min. Participants were
instructed on how to do the fNIRS task immediately prior to data
acquisition, and completed a practice task that went through an
example trial from each of the three conditions before beginning
the experiment.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 560
Bowman et al. Children’s belief and desire reasoning
FIGURE 1 | (A) Examples of single trials for Diverse-Desires condition (left), Diverse-Beliefs condition (middle), and Diverse-Physical condition (right) with examples of
information phase (top) and target questions (bottom) as well as sample graphics for both food and toy trial types. (B) Schematic of experimental and rest blocks as
presented within a run. Adapted from Bowman et al. (2012).
Behavioral Tasks
Standardized verbal and non-verbal intelligence tests from the
KBIT-2 (Kaufman and Kaufman, 1990) were administered after
the fNIRS imaging. All participants performed at age- and grade-
appropriate levels.
fNIRS Imaging
Data Acquisition and Procedure
Hemodynamic response was recorded using a Hitachi ETG-
4000 with 48 channels acquiring data at 10 Hz. A subset of 36
channels was used for the present study. The near infrared lasers
(emitter optodes) were factory set to 690 and 830 nm. Optodes
were segregated into three 3 × 3 arrays each containing ﬁve
emitters and four detectors to create 12 channels per array (a
channel is deﬁned as the curve of near-infrared light traveling
between the emitter and detector from which the hemodynamic
response is measured; see Figure 2). Optode separation was
3 cm.
Three 9-optode arrays (center, left, and right) were secured on
participants’ heads using custom-made fabric ties, and positioned
according to the 10–20 system using Fp, T3, and T4 coordinates
as placement landmarks to maximally overlay the AFC (center
array), and the left and right TPJ (left and right arrays). See
Figure 2 for placement details. We also conducted magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) scanning to verify and further clarify
the channels’ neuroanatomical positioning. Photographs were
taken of the secured optode positions before and after children
completed the fNIRS task to ensure that the optodes did not move
over the course of the experiment.
ROI Identification: MRI Coregristration
Separate from the fNIRS imaging and behavioral testing
session, an MRI anatomical scan was collected from one
child representative of the sample (typically developing male,
age: 102 months). Three 3 × 3 arrays of vitamin E tablets
were constructed to exactly mimic the optode arrays (i.e.,
tablets arranged in same geometrical structure and situated
3 cm apart). These arrays were positioned on the child’s
head using the same 10–20 coordinates as used to position
the optodes (a method discussed in the review by Tsuzuki
and Dan, 2014) and were secured in place using MRI-
safe tape and wraps. Then, a T1-weighted Fast Spoiled
Gradient Echo scan was conducted to obtain the high
resolution MRI anatomical image (43 sagittal slices, slice
thickness = 3 mm, TE = 5.7 ms, TR = 250 ms, ﬂip
angle = 90◦, bandwidth = 15.63, F.O.V. = 22 cm). Data were
collected on a three Tesla scanner at the university’s fMRI
laboratory facility, while the child watched a short, silent cartoon
video.
The anatomical image was used to identify the speciﬁc fNIRS
channels overlaying the left TPJ (LTPJ) and right TPJ (RTPJ)
focal ROIs for analysis in our child sample. The process of
coregistering fNIRS optodes withMRI structural scans to identify
underlying cortical areas has been previously published with
pediatric samples (e.g., Lloyd-Fox et al., 2014). The process of
MRI co-registration for the present study was as follows. MNI
coordinates for LTPJ and RTPJ were taken from a separate
fMRI study that examined ToM reasoning in 12 comparably
aged typically developing children, 7- and 8-years-old (Bowman
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FIGURE 2 | (A-left) Schematic of center, left, and right optode arrays showing emitters as red solid circles, detectors as blue open circles, and channels as green
rectangles. 10–20 landmarks corresponding to specific optode placements are labeled. Green numbers within rectangles mark the positions of the specific channels
used for analyses. (A-right) Depiction of spacing between detector and emitter optodes and channel of near-infrared light penetrating 3 cm through cortex.
(B) Photographs of optode placement on child participant guided by 10–20 landmarks. For the center array, the center optode in the most ventral row was placed
over coordinate Fp, and the center optode in the most dorsal row was placed in line with coordinate Fz. For the left and right arrays, the most ventral anterior optode
was placed 3 cm posterior to coordinate T3 (for left side) and T4 (for right side), and the most dorsal anterior optode was positioned so as to be 3 cm posterior to
the T3–C3 line (for left side) and T4–C4 line (for right side).
et al., in preparation; see also Gweon et al., 2012). This fMRI
study deﬁned LTPJ and RTPJ ROI based on a combination of
anatomical information (from separate localizer tasks as used
in previous literature, e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe
et al., 2009) and functional activation from a ‘mental-state
condition > physical control condition’ contrast—an approach
to ROI deﬁnition that has been validated in previous pediatric
fMRI examinations that used similar ToM tasks (Saxe et al.,
2009; Gweon et al., 2012). The grand average and standard
deviation for the left and right TPJ ROIs were calculated for
this sample of 12 children: −54, −52, 26, ±6 for LTPJ and 54,
−52, 26, ±6 for RTPJ. For the present study, these ranges of
coordinates were used to deﬁne reasonably broad left and right
TPJ ROIs in the single child’s MRI anatomical scan, in order to
identify which particular fNIRS channels were positioned over
the left and right TPJ. Speciﬁcally, using MRIcro software (http://
www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricro/mricro.html), we
marked on the child’s structural scan a reasonably broad ROI
surrounding the mean MNI coordinates from the age-matched
sample, based on the sample standard deviation (i.e., −54, −52,
26, ±6 for LTPJ and 54, −52, 26, ±6). We then determined
which fNIRS channels (given their 3 cm penetration arch between
emitter and detector) overlaid these ROIs, given the vitamin E
placement which critically mimicked the fNIRS optode emitter
and detectors. This process revealed that two channels penetrated
our ROI (channels 2 and 4 on the right and channels 13 and 16 on
the left). Thus data from these channels were taken as pinpointing
the right and left TPJ ROIs, and were used to guide the ROI
analyses (see Figure 3).
fNIRS Data Processing and Analyses
Functional near-infrared spectroscopy data were exported and
analyzed using custom software in Matlab (The MathWorks,
Inc.) validated in previous fNIRS studies (e.g., Kovelman et al.,
2009, 2011, 2012, 2014; Shalinsky et al., 2009), and in line with
diﬀuse optical imaging principles (Boas et al., 2004; Huppert
et al., 2009). In brief, after the recording session, data were
exported and analyzed using MATLAB-based software (we thank
Dr. Laura Ann Petitto for making this software available to
us, for details see Kovelman et al., 2009). First, the raw time
course data were converted into units of optical density change
(OD). The data were further band-pass ﬁltered in the range
between 0.01 and 0.8 Hz. This band-pass ﬁlter was selected a
priori, based on previous research. Speciﬁcally, the normalized
intensity was band-pass ﬁltered using third-order Butterworth
ﬁlters with 0.8 and 0.01 Hz cutoﬀ frequencies, respectively. The
low pass ﬁlter value is designed to remove mainly measurement
noise and cardiac physiological noise (>0.8 Hz), while the high
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FIGURE 3 | Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) anatomical scan of representative child participant with vitamin E probes secured to head mimicking
optode positions (top left and right). Focal channels of interest are labeled for the left TPJ (top left) and right TPJ (top right). Bottom panel depicts the TPJ regions
of interest (red circles) that include the range of MNI coordinates for left TPJ (bottom left) and right TPJ (bottom right) as identified in a separate theory-of-mind fMRI
study with children of similar ages to the present study.
pass ﬁlter value removes slow drift caused by motion or optode
slow shifting (<0.01 Hz). These ﬁlter values are on par with
other studies which have used low-pass cut-oﬀ frequencies from
0.1 Hz (Naito et al., 2007) to 1.25 Hz (Zhang et al., 2007). High-
pass cut-oﬀ frequencies in other studies include 0.004 Hz (Zhang
et al., 2007) and 0.01 Hz (Gratton et al., 2006). Participants’ data
were baseline corrected by subtracting out the mean intensity
of the optical signal recorded during the 15 s rest periods. The
hemoglobin concentration change data (CHbO and CHbR) were
calculated using the modiﬁed Beer–Lambert law (mBL; Delpy
et al., 1988), yielding HbO (oxygenated hemoglobin) and HbR
(deoxygenated hemoglobin) values (see Huppert et al., 2009 for
details). Speciﬁcally, the signal was ﬁrst converted to optical
density change using the following equation: OD = − log ( ItIo ).
Then the OD went through the motion correction process, and
was band-pass ﬁltered. Finally, the processed data were converted
into HbO and HbR changes via the mBL law:
ODλ1 = (εHbOλ1 · CHbO + εHbRλ1 · CHb) · DPFλ1 · L
ODλ2 = (εHbOλ2 · CHbO + εHbRλ2 · CHb) · DPFλ2 · L
The calculated HbO and HbR concentration changes are
considered to be percent signal change (PSC).
The time course data (all channels, all conditions) for each
participant were plotted in Matlab and visually inspected for
motion artifacts and signal quality. Speciﬁcally, coders visually
inspected data in all channels, in every block, for all runs, for
all participants. Artifacts were identiﬁed as any portions of data
in which signal change occurred over a period of time that was
too fast to be physiological (speciﬁcally, a change in magnitude
of response >0.2 and occurring in less than 3 s). Coders ﬁrst
identiﬁed portions of data that they judged to likely meet criteria
for artifact, and then conﬁrmed by calculating the magnitude and
time period of that portion of the data. If criteria were met, the
channel, block, run, and participant number were recorded and
ﬂagged for removal. Likewise, individual channels that showed
activation at either >5 or 0 were also removed. Finally, any block
in which 10 channels were bad were also removed. Only data
that met these criteria were removed. Given the subjectivity of
initially identifying portions of artifact, inspection was done by
one primary coder, with two additional coders inspecting 20% of
the data to ensure reliability. This method of artifact rejection is
in line with prior published fNIRS work examining child data
(e.g., Kovelman et al., 2012). In total, the percentage of blocks
containing minimal or no artifact that were thus retained for
analyses was 96.4% for the Beliefs condition, 98.2% for the Desires
condition, and 99.4% for the Physical condition.
Coders also visually inspected individual participant
hemodynamic response plots to identify epochs of clear
neural activity from which to extract oxy hemoglobin values for
focal analyses. Speciﬁcally, for each participant, in each block,
coders—blind to condition, focal channels/ROIs, and study
hypotheses (inspected data were collapsed across condition, and
across all channels in a given probe set)—inspected oxy and
deoxy plots beginning 1 s prior to block onset, across the entire
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26-s block, and up to 4 s post-block termination, to identify
the windows of time in which the oxy signal rose and began to
fall, accompanied by a deoxy signal down-sweep and beginning
rise. Coders were given Figure 6A in the Boas et al. (2004)
paper as a canonical pattern to identify (focusing on the oxy
and deoxy curves). Given the subjectivity involved in this visual
inspection, coding was again done by one primary coder with
two additional coders ensuring reliability. A similar method of
window identiﬁcation has been used in previously published
fNIRS research (Kovelman et al., 2008, 2009, 2012, 2014). For
the left and right focal arrays, the window of 0–20 s post-
experimental block onset captured the canonical hemodynamic
response curves indicative of brain activity (Boas et al., 2004).
Thus, this window was used to extract mean oxy-hemoglobin
values for ﬁnal analyses. See Figure 4 for HbO and HbR plots
across the 0–20 s window, for each of the three conditions.
To summarize, within the 0–20 s window, percent signal
change in oxy-hemoglobin (HbO) values were averaged across
blocks of the same condition type, across all usable participant
data, to obtain a grand average mean HbO response for each of
the three conditions. HbO constitutes a far greater portion of
signal form the cortex (76%) compared to HbR (19%; Gagnon
et al., 2012). Moreover, HbO is sampled over a larger region of
brain tissue, and the signal-to-noise contrast for HbO is better
than HbR (Strangman et al., 2002). The correlations between
the canonical model of the hemodynamic response function and
models of HbO (versus HbR) are consistently higher (Huppert
et al., 2009). Thus, we used HbO as a more robust index of
underlying neural activity. This grand mean HbO response was
then compared across Beliefs, Desires, and Physical conditions to
examine the pattern of brain activity across the two ROIs—right
channels 2 and 4 (RTPJ), and left channels 13 and 16 (LTPJ)—and
in a contrast control center channel overlaying the AFC.
For our focal TPJ ROIs, as is commonly done in ROI
analyses (e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), we conducted
both a group-level ROI as well as an individual-level ROI
analysis, to provide a fuller picture of the diﬀerences in brain
activation across conditions. For the group ROI analysis, we
averaged each participant’s data from channels 2 and 4 on
the right, and channels 13 and 16 on the left, to create left
and right TPJ ROIs for each participant. For the individual
ROI analysis, the ROI selection criterion was based on an
overall general mental-state activation (averaged across Beliefs
and Desires conditions) versus physical activation pattern.
Thus, signiﬁcant Desire > Physical and Belief > Physical
results are more likely, given the functional deﬁnition for the
individual ROIs rests on a “Mental” (i.e., Belief and Desire
average) > Physical criterion. Critically though, this functional
criterion yields a more conservative approach to investigating
crucial diﬀerences between the two focal mental conditions—
i.e., Belief versus Desire—because it directs where to look
for such distinctions based on a the combined mental—i.e.,
Beliefs and Desires—versus non-mental criterion. It is the
investigation of these beliefs-desires diﬀerences that are central
to the study.
Speciﬁcally, to create individual RTPJ ROIs, we averaged
across Beliefs and Desires conditions, in each of the right
channels separately (i.e., ch2 and 4, separately) to calculate the
average ‘mental-state activation’ in each of those channels, for
each child. We then conducted per-channel comparisons of
children’s brain activation during this mental-state condition
versus their activation during the Physical condition (e.g., ch2
Mental-state verses ch2 Physical), and selected the channel (i.e., 2
or 4) that demonstrated the greatest Mental> Physical activation
diﬀerence to represent each child’s individual RTPJ ROI. The
following selection criteria were employed. For each child,Mental
mean oxy had to be signiﬁcantly greater (at p < 0.001) across
the 0–20 s window than Physical mean oxy. If both channels met
Mental > Physical signiﬁcance criterion, oxy signal was averaged
across the 0–20 s window, Physical activation was subtracted
from Mental activation in each contending channel, and the
channel yielding the greatest positive value was selected. No child
had identical activation diﬀerences in each channel, and children
without a Mental > Physical pattern across either channel were
excluded from the individual ROI analysis. We repeated these
steps for channels 13 and 16 to deﬁne individual LTPJ ROIs. For
RTPJ, 8/11 children were included in analyses (ﬁve children with
a ch2 ROI and three with ch4 ROI). For LTPJ, 7/11 children were
included in analyses (one child with a ch13 ROI and six with
ch16 ROI). This process is in line with existing ROI selection
processes for fMRI investigations of ToM in children that also
target regions of maximal mental versus non-mental diﬀerences
as part of the individual ROI selection criterion (Saxe et al., 2009;
Gweon et al., 2012). Given that the AFC ROI was analyzed solely
as contrast for these focal TPJ ROIs, one channel was selected
from the AFC to serve as this contrast, and thus no individual
ROI analyses were carried out.
Results
fNIRS Task Performance Accuracy
As expected, children were better at solving diverse-desires
(90.3% correct) and physical control tasks (87.9%) compared
to diverse-beliefs (62.3%); Beliefs condition versus Desires and
Physical conditions, t(10) = −6.07, p < 0.001, t(10) = −6.93,
p < 0.001, respectively. Desires and Physical conditions did
not diﬀer from each other, t(10) = 0.91, p = 0.385. This
pattern is identical to performance accuracy on the parallel
ERP task in Bowman et al. (2012), and is consistent with
numerous ﬁndings demonstrating that, compared to desire-
understanding, belief-understanding emerges later in childhood
(see meta-analysis in Wellman and Liu, 2004), and can be less
accurate/ﬂuent in older children and adults (e.g., Malle, 2004).
Neither accuracy in any condition, nor age of participant were
related to mean HbO in any ROI, for either group or individual
ROI analyses (all rs < 0.27, ps > 0.42). Thus, neither age nor
performance accuracy were considered further in analyses with
HbO.
Brain Activation
For all ROI analyses below we adopted a traditional alpha of
p < 0.05, but we also considered results marginally signiﬁcant at
p < 0.1.
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FIGURE 4 | Averaged HbO (solid lines) and HbR (dotted lines) time course for beliefs (blue thick line), desires (red thinner line), and physical (green
thinnest line) conditions. Curves exhibit the canonical slow surge in oxy-hemoglobin with simultaneous decrease in deoxy-hemoglobin over the course of the
experimental block, in the 0–20 s window selected for analysis (total block duration = 26 s).
Group ROI Analyses: Right and Left TPJ
Results of the MRI anatomical scan implicated more than one
fNIRS channel as covering the RTPJ and LTPJ ROIs, and so we
averaged data across channels 2 and 4 (right side) and 13 and 16
(left side) to create group right and left TPJ ROIs, respectively.
Figure 4 demonstrates clearly greater mean HbO for the
Beliefs compared to the Desires and Physical conditions across
the analysis window, for both left and right TPJ. Indeed, omnibus
repeated measures ANOVAs comparing mean HbO activation
(averaged over each left and right channel pair) across Beliefs,
Desires, and Physical conditions revealed a signiﬁcant condition
eﬀect in the RTPJ [F(2) = 3.67, p = 0.043], and a marginally
signiﬁcant eﬀect in the LTPJ [F(2) = 2.65, p = 0.096]. Results
of follow-up paired-samples t-tests are shown in Figure 5A and
the top panel of Table 1. For both RTPJ and LTPJ, mean HbO
was greater for Beliefs compared to both Desires and Physical
conditions. The Beliefs-Desires diﬀerence was signiﬁcant for
RTPJ, and marginally signiﬁcant for LTPJ. In short, RTPJ shows
diﬀerential brain response to the demands of the Belief versus
Desire conditions, with belief-activation greater than desire-
activation. A similar but less robust Beliefs-Desires distinction
exists in LTPJ.
Individual ROI Analysis: Right and Left TPJ
To take account of possible heterogeneity in ROIs’ functional
organization across participants, we also conducted an individual
ROI analysis by analyzing data from either channel 2 or 4 (on
the right), and either channel 13 or 16 (on the left) for each
participant. See methods for full individual ROI selection details.
As shown in Figure 5B, for both RTPJ and LTPJ ROIs,
the predicted pattern of participants’ activation for Beliefs
greater than activation for both Desires and Physical conditions
was again demonstrated. In line with ﬁndings from the
group ROI analyses, in RTPJ, mean activation for Beliefs
was signiﬁcantly greater than for Desires, and in LTPJ, the
Beliefs-Desires distinction was again only marginally signiﬁcant
(see bottom panel of Table 1 for statistics). More clearly
than in the group ROI analyses, and as expected given
the function individual ROI criterion of mental > physical
channels, these analyses revealed that participants’ activation
for Beliefs was signiﬁcantly greater than Physical activation in
both RTPJ and LTPJ. Moreover, participants’ Desires activation
was greater than Physical activation in RTPJ and LTPJ as
well.
These results replicate the ﬁnding from the group ROI analysis
that the TPJ is recruited for belief-reasoning, over and above
recruitment for desire-reasoning, with the eﬀect demonstrated
most robustly in the RTPJ. The Beliefs > Physical ﬁndings also
demonstrate TPJ specialization for processing beliefs, beyond
non-mental processing more generally.
Contrast AFC ROI
Mean activation in a center channel over the AFC was examined
across the three conditions to provide a contrast for the activation
patterns in the focal TPJ ROIs. Contrary to the clear activation
diﬀerences in TPJ ROIs, there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in activation in the AFC region (ts < 1.31, ps > 0.22). As
can be seen in Figure 6, this contrast region shows greater
signal change for the Physical than for the Mental (beliefs
and desires) conditions, which is the reverse of the pattern of
activation in the focal TPJ ROIs. To compare brain activity
in Beliefs, Desires, and Physical conditions across the three
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FIGURE 5 | Percent mean oxy (HbO) signal change for Beliefs
conditions (blue solid), Desires conditions (red striped), and Physical
conditions (green dotted) in LTPJ and RTPJ for the group ROI analyses
(A), and the individual ROI analyses with ‘Mental > Physical’ inclusion
criteria (B). Results indicate specialization for belief-reasoning (over
desire-reasoning) in the RTPJ as evidenced by significantly greater oxy signal
for beliefs versus desires conditions across both analyses. Results also
suggest some evidence for belief-specialization in the LTPJ, though effects are
less robust.∗p < 0.05, p† < 0.1.
ROIs (LTPJ, RTPJ, and AFC), we conducted a 3 (ROI: LTPJ,
RTPJ, AFC) × 3 (Condition: Beliefs, Desires, Physical) repeated-
measures ANOVA. A signiﬁcant main eﬀect of condition
conﬁrmed statistical diﬀerences across ROIs: F(2) = 24.11,
p < 0.001. Follow up 2 (ROI) × (3 Condition) RM-ANOVAs
comparing RTPJ with AFC and LTPJ with AFC also yielded
TABLE 1 | Paired-samples t-tests comparing children’s mean
oxy-hemoglobin response in the three condition contrasts in left and right
TPJ for group and individual ROI analyses.
Comparison RTPJ LTPJ
Group ROI (Channel-pair Average)
Belief versus Desire t(10) = 2.32, p = 0.043∗ t(10) = 1.87, p = 0.091†
Belief versus Physical t(10) = 1.75, p = 0.110 t(10) = 1.56, p = 0.149
Desire versus Physical t(10) = −0.46, p = 0.653 t(10) = −0.33, p = 0.749
Individual ROI (Mental > Physical)
Belief versus Desire t(7) = 2.42, p = 0.046∗ t(6) = 2.21, p = 0.069†
Belief versus Physical t(7) = 2.78, p = 0.027∗ t(6) = 3.24, p = 0.018∗
Desire versus Physical t(7) = 2.16, p = 0.068† t(6) = 4.01, p = 0.007∗
∗ Indicates significance at p = 0.05;† indicates significance at p = 0.1.
signiﬁcant main eﬀects of ROI, further conﬁrming that the
pattern of activation in the contrast AFC diﬀered from our
focal TPJ ROIs [for RTPJ: F(1) = 37.901, p < 0.001; for LTPJ:
F(1) = 27.81, p < 0.001].
Discussion
Given that the Beliefs, Desires, and Physical (control) conditions
all had the same perceptual and linguistic structure including
similar two-part comparisons, diﬀerences in neural activation can
be attributed to diﬀerences in reasoning about the content of each
condition (i.e., belief-reasoning, desire-reasoning, or reasoning
about physical locations) beyond the memory and processing
demands common in all conditions. Accordingly, as was clearly
demonstrated in our most conservative Group ROI analysis, in
both left and especially right TPJ, as predicted, brain activation
for belief-reasoning was distinctly greater than brain activation
for both physical-reasoning and, most focally, desire-reasoning.
The beliefs-physical distinction was visible in both left and right
TPJ, in line with existing ﬁndings that children’s TPJ is recruited
for mental-sate reasoning versus reasoning about non-mental
information (e.g., Gweon et al., 2012). Critically, participants’
activation for belief-reasoning was signiﬁcantly greater than
desire-reasoning for right TPJ, demonstrating a clear, robust
belief-specialization on the right. Though visible across analyses
for left TPJ, that beliefs-desires distinction reached only marginal
signiﬁcance.
Brain activation over a frontal surface region (AFC)
demonstrated a diﬀerent pattern of activation from the focal TPJ
ROIs. Such diﬀerential activation patterns in this contrast region
indicate that the focal patterns in the right and left TPJ represent
brain activity in the temporoparietal cortex, and are not products
of systemic noise, or a global activation pattern occurring over the
whole head (Boas et al., 2004). Activity in the AFC served only as
contrast for our focal TPJ regions, and thus we do not discuss the
frontal patterns of activity in depth. However, though the overall
reduced signal in the AFC compared to TPJ can be expected given
that frontal optodes are generally less sensitive to near-infrared
light absorption changes (Cooper et al., 2012), it is possible that
such reduced signal also reﬂects the presence of the default mode
network (which exhibits reduced frontal activity during cognitive
tasks; Greicius et al., 2002). Future research could explore this
possibility.
Clarifying Neural Correlates of Belief- and
Desire-Reasoning
Results of the present study clarify those of the parallel ERP
study that used our same neuroimaging task with similar-aged
children (Bowman et al., 2012). That ERP study demonstrated
that in 7- and 8-years-old, participants’ neural activation for
belief-reasoning diﬀerentiated from desire-reasoning over right
posterior scalp regions. In that study this diﬀerence was
most prominent when analyses were concentrated on only
the trials in which children performed correctly. While, in
the present study, the small sample size and block design
of the fNIRS study prevented separate analysis of correct
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FIGURE 6 | Percent mean oxy (HbO) signal change for Beliefs
conditions (blue solid), Desires conditions (red striped), and Physical
conditions (green dotted) in the AFC contrast ROI. Results indicate a
pattern of activation that contrasts with the focal left and right TPJ ROIs.
trials, our fNIRS data also show diﬀerences in brain response
for belief- and desire-reasoning, speciﬁcally in magnitude of
activation. Future fNIRS studies with larger samples that
examine only blocks in which children performed correctly
may reveal even more robust diﬀerences across belief, desire,
and non-mental reasoning. It is possible that diﬀerences in
brain activation are due to diﬀerences in computation diﬃculty
across conditions. However, adult ERP research (Liu et al.,
2009) using the same task as the present study (and as the
parallel child ERP study) suggests otherwise: adults in that
parallel ERP study, who critically obtained identical near-perfect
accuracy on all three conditions, also showed distinguishable
neural responses for belief- versus desire-reasoning at right
posterior electrodes. Future, fNIRS studies with older children
who are able to achieve similar performance accuracy across
conditions, and with modiﬁed (e.g., slowed) tasks that foster
increased accuracy even at younger ages can shed more light
on this question. Larger samples should also be collected
to raise power. Nonetheless, as noted, the current results
provide ﬁndings that are in line with previous ERP (Liu et al.,
2009; Bowman et al., 2012) and fMRI research (Saxe et al.,
2009; Gweon et al., 2012) on neural correlates of mental-state
reasoning.
Beyond replication of ERP results, ﬁndings from the present
fNIRS study make two additional, critical contributions. First,
the increased spatial resolution and unambiguous localization
of the fNIRS data demonstrate with high probability that the
‘right posterior’ belief-desire distinction (in ERP data from
Bowman et al., 2012) includes regions of speciﬁcally the right
TPJ. Second, the fNIRS data demonstrate that participants’
activation in right TPJ for belief-reasoning is clearly greater
than activation for desire-reasoning (compared to ERP results
in which diﬀerences in waveform amplitude do not necessarily
translate to diﬀerences in magnitude of neural activity), and
further suggest greater activation for belief-reasoning compared
to physical-reasoning as well. These additional clariﬁcations
help conﬁrm that the pattern of activation in the right TPJ
is indeed one of specialization for beliefs. Thus, by 6- to 10-
years-old, speciﬁcally the right TPJ shows a more focused and
ampliﬁed recruitment of brain substrates for belief-reasoning
in particular, beyond non-mental processing, and even beyond
processing other mental information such as desires. Perhaps
also notable is that plots of the HbO time course for right TPJ
reveal, qualitatively, a more pronounced dissociation between
Beliefs and Desires conditions toward the end of the block
compared to the beginning. Future, research may want to
consider this potentially intriguing ﬁnding, which could suggest
that diﬀerences in brain processes for belief- and desire-reasoning
emerge only later in the time course.
More speculatively, the present study found initial evidence
for possible involvement of the left TPJ in belief-reasoning,
though it is important to note that the belief-desires comparison
reached only marginal signiﬁcance there. Several explanations
could account for such a ﬁnding. It has been argued that
neuro-cognitive activations can become more focused and
narrowed with development (Casey et al., 2000; but see
Poldrack, 2010). And documented changes in networks and
connectivity have also been found across development (Fair
et al., 2009). One intriguing possibility for the present study
is that possibly as children age, belief-specialization becomes
more focused to the right TPJ, and left posterior specialization
for beliefs diminishes. Indeed, Saxe et al. (2009) measured
brain activation (via fMRI) as typically developing 6- through
10-years-old listened to stories describing peoples’ mental
states (mental condition), peoples’ interactions and appearances
(social condition), and physical objects and scenes (physical
condition). Results showed greater activation in the mental
condition versus the social condition in both the left and
right TPJ, but as children aged, speciﬁcally the right TPJ was
found to increase in selectivity for mental-state processing (in
comparison to processing both physical and social stories).
A similar pattern of increasing right (but not left) TPJ
specialization as children 5–11 years increased in accuracy
for mental-state reasoning was found in Gweon et al. (2012).
Our fNIRS data and methods—with their increased spatial
resolution, clearer measures of individual variation in brain
responses, and generally more targeted analytic approach to
left TPJ examinations—could have been necessary to reveal the
weaker left posterior specialization, whereas the ERP analyses
in Bowman et al. (2012) may not have been able to reveal
such a left-side eﬀect. Future fNIRS investigations of belief-
and desire-reasoning in older children, as well as younger
children, and with overall greater sample sizes are important
to further explore this intriguing potential developmental
eﬀect.
Broader Implications for ToM Development
Our pattern in which participants’ activations for belief-
reasoning clearly exceeded those for desire-reasoning in TPJ has
direct implications for understanding the behavioral ﬁndings
demonstrating that children reach an explicit understanding of
desires before they come to an explicit understanding of beliefs
(e.g., Wellman and Liu, 2004), pointing to a neural mechanism
underlying this progression. That is, our results represent a
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straightforward developmental possibility that an understanding
of beliefs may build on prior desire-understanding, evidenced
by additional substrates in right TPJ regions being recruited
for speciﬁcally belief reasoning—beyond recruitment for desire-
reasoning—as belief-understanding becomes more distinct and
accurate. Such a developmental scenario builds from behavioral
evidence that children progress from an explicit understanding
of desires to an explicit understanding of beliefs (e.g., Wellman,
2002; Wellman and Liu, 2004). Indeed, our performance
data show that even by middle childhood, children still have
greater accuracy on diverse-desires tasks compared to diverse-
beliefs tasks (although still younger children, on average, pass
diverse-desires and diverse-beliefs tasks, our tasks presented
information quickly and thus were more diﬃcult overall)—
a pattern consistent with ﬁndings demonstrating that belief-
understanding can be less accurate/ﬂuent in older children and
adults (e.g., Malle, 2004).
Conclusion
Our ﬁndings highlight the utility of fNIRS data for identifying
neural specialization in targeted ROI. Beyond providing
substantive data of import in its own right, the methods and
data we present also provide a platform for future research
to address some of the limitations of the present study
and to further uncover the neural underpinnings of ToM
developments. A critical and obvious limitation is that our
sample size is relatively small, thus conﬁrmation of these
eﬀects with additional children are needed. Future research
may also consider using an HRF modeling based regression
approach, as our block-averaging approach may have been
more conservative in revealing condition diﬀerences given
the peak in the HbO curves happened toward the end of
the block. Additionally, children of younger ages should be
studied. Behaviorally, it is among preschoolers that the biggest
diﬀerences between desire- versus belief-reasoning are apparent,
and it is at this younger age when dramatic diﬀerences in
explicit belief-reasoning emerge. The child-friendly qualities of
fNIRS and the present study design could be usefully employed
with these younger children (for whom no current fMRI
data are available that examine belief- and desire-reasoning
separately, and from whom fMRI data are very diﬃcult to
collect).
Even in advance of useful future research, the present study
sheds important light on the neural correlates of belief- and
desire-reasoning in childhood by pointing to a possible neural
mechanism underlying the developmental progression from
understanding desires to understanding beliefs evidenced by
numerous behavioral studies (e.g., Wellman and Liu, 2004).
Speciﬁcally, an explicit understanding of beliefs may build oﬀ
prior understanding of desires, paced by a specialization in the
TPJ for reasoning about speciﬁcally beliefs (over and above
desires). Future research, using fNIRS methods in particular, can
now shed further light on how diﬀerent types of mental states
build to form an expert ToM.
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